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The Right to Bear Arms. By Carl Bakal. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Co., 1966. Pp. 392. $6.95.
Since November 22, 1963 the issue of the indiscriminate distribu-
tion, possession and use of small arms-rifles, shotguns and hand guns-
has been fiercely debated throughout America. On one side of the
debate are the spokesmen for law enforcement-largely committed to
stringent controls, articulate, emotional and, judging by results, notably
ineffective. On the other side are the gun manufacturers and dealers,
the hunters, the sportsmen, and, surprisingly, many of the conserva-
tionists-opposed to any system of a priori controls and, again judging
by results, extremely effective. Various surveys indicate that the great
majority of Americans strongly favors laws to keep firearms out of the
hands of those who would use them venally, recklessly or carelessly.
Carl Bakal documents the need for effective firearms controls, and
analyzes the nature and the logic of the opposition. Bakal himself sup-
ports a pervasive system of small weapons control; he seems convinced
that there is something psychologically out of kilter in anyone who is
interested in guns-even as collector, hunter, or marksman.
Despite Dallas, rifles, shotguns and hand guns are still freely avail-
able to all Americans: if one state's law prohibits purchase without a
license, the next state is likely to have no such prohibition. And since
Dallas 60,000 Americans have been killed and 350,000 wounded by
guns.
Would weapon controls reduce this carnage? Would not the accidents
have occurred in any event, despite a national registration and licensing
system? Would the homicides have taken place with some other
weapon? And would not persons intent on suicide have turned to
another method?
"Guns don't kill people; people do," according to those (such as
the National Rifle Association) who support penalties for misuse but
oppose limitations on possession. They point out that possession of
other potentially lethal weapons, such as kitchen knives, bricks, shille-
laghs and the hands of a karate expert are not controlled, and yet are
available for mayhem. But a gun's only purpose is to kill; the knife, the
brick, the shillelagh and the hand have basic purposes unrelated to
dealing death. A second difference is that one who kills with a gun is
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remote from the victim. Psychologically it is probably easier for a killer
to end a life by pulling a trigger and letting the gun do the killing than
by actually involving himself with the victim as he must with a wielded
weapon; practically, it is easier to kill with a gun because the victim,
in most cases, cannot defend himself.
Opponents of gun legislation to the contrary, controls will very prob-
ably reduce the rate of homicides by removing the gun as an unusually
effective and easy-to-handle weapon in crises of anger and passion. Most
homicides are committed on the spur of the moment, and the victims
in some 80 per cent of cases are relatives (30 per cent) or acquaintances
(50 per cent) of the killer.
Three types of firearm controls are generally proposed. A registra-
tion law might require every gun manufactured or distributed in the
United States to bear an inscribed identification number. Second, the
state might prevent guns from being sold to any person who does not
have a permit. Finally, the law could establish a waiting period before
delivery so that local law enforcement officers could be informed of
the sale, make an investigation, and present objections (such as the
objection that the purchaser has no permit, or that his permit has been
revoked).
Registration would facilitate tracing and identifying guns and might
itself deter their purchase for illegitimate ends. A permit law could
reduce the flow of weapons into the hands of the immature, the men-
tally unbalanced, or the criminal, or could restrict ownership to those
with a specific need. Training prerequisites to ownership or possession
might insure that those coming into the possession of small arms at
least know how to use them safely.
The effectiveness of all these controls would depend, of course, on
many considerations, including their geographical coverage and the
sanctions employed.
New York State's Sullivan Law prohibits ownership or possession
of hand guns by unlicensed persons: in New York City, which ad-
ministers the law prohibitively, only some 17,000 permits are outstand-
ing; in the rest of the state in which a more casual approach is taken,
some 445,000 permits have been issued. The Sullivan Law does not
prevent hand guns from reaching the hands of New York City's com-
mitted criminals-they are freely available from sources in other
states-but it does aid law enforcement by making unlicensed posses-
sion a crime in and of itself.
1
1. One massive administrative problem in connection with the establishment of any
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Opponents of firearms controls argue that any licensing system would
handicap those with a legitimate interest in possessing firearms, with-
out stemming the flow of arms to criminals and others who may mis-
use them. But available statistics provide a convincing argument for
vigorous supervision of access to small arms. The United States has a
higher rate of death by firearms than most other countries of the world:
in 1963 it was 9 per 100,000 population, compared to .23 for Japan;
.55 for England; 1.09 for Germany; 4.22 for Canada;-all countries in
which the availability of firearms is strictly limited.
And the Northeastern section of the United States, where hand gun
controls are common, has a far lower rate of homicide than other
sectors of the country, notably the South, where no such controls exist.
New York City, where gun permits are not easily given, had a homicide
rate of 8.1 per 100,000 in 1965, of which only about 25 per cent were
committed with firearms, while during the same time Dallas had a
homicide rate of 17 per 100,000, some 70 per cent of which were
inflicted by guns.
The basic question for legislators considering controls is what should
be considered a legitimate purpose for ownership of a gun. Are there
any besides hunting, or perhaps target shooting for sport? We might
add certain private law enforcement functions, such as guarding banks.
We certainly should not add protection from criminals. This is a
function of the community through its law enforcement activity; if
protection from criminals were a permissible reason for the possession
of firearms, controlled licensing would become impossible.
Certain persons should be disqualified notwithstanding their desire
to hunt. The mentally ill and accident-prone seem obvious categories.
But the problem is not an easy one. What crimes should disqualify a
person? Certainly crimes of violence, and crimes directly violative of
the security of the community, such as burglary and robbery. How
about the more sophisticated white collar crimes-tax evasion, for
example? Is there any reason why an otherwise law-abiding tax evader
should not be permitted to hunt? And how does one identify the men-
tally dangerous? Is prior commitment an adequate criterion? For every
mentally ill person who has a prior history of confinement there are
doubtless several with no such history who should not be entrusted
with firearms.
broad system of gun controls is that of coping with the vast numbers of small arms already
in private hands-estimates of the quantity range from 50 million upward. If there Is to
be a permit system these guns will have to be brought within it.
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Should age and vision be factors in determining the availability of
a permit? Certainly children should not be permitted to possess guns
(and many states already have minimum age limitations). At what
age is it reasonable to assume sufficient maturity to be trusted with a
gun? Certainly, also, applicants for permits should be required to
demonstrate that they have adequate vision and skill to handle a gun.
Perhaps permit holders over a certain age should be required to submit
to annual testing of their capacities and skills.
Should guns themselves be periodically inspected and tested, to be
sure that they are safe? Should ballistics tests be made of registered rifled
guns, in anticipation that these tests may assist police investigation?
The formulation of workable criteria with respect to all of these
problems must perforce be left to experience. The operators of auto-
mobiles on our roadways are licensed and have been for many years:
comparatively recently we have seen developed new criteria designed
to promote safety on the roads: revocation of licenses upon conviction
for moving violations; eye tests for all drivers; re-examination for the
elderly; annual inspections of automobiles over a certain age. The gun
is potentially an even more lethal weapon than the automobile-let
us hope that the development of operable criteria will not take so long.
But the adoption of a permit system for those who possess guns, and a
registration system for guns themselves, need not, and should not,
await the development of all the requisite criteria.
Does all of this smack of 1984, and the infringement of personal
liberty? Opponents of gun controls say it does-and they say further
that there is a constitutional right to bear arms, memorialized in the
Second Amendment to the Constitution, which allegedly prohibits
arms control. But this Amendment relates the prohibition against
infringement of "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" to
the need to maintain a well-regulated militia for "the security of a
free State." In 1967 America the guns kept by individuals in their
homes are not related to military needs and quite obviously do not
fit under the constitutional umbrella.
The Small Arms Lobby
Perhaps Mr. Bakal's great contribution is his discussion of the oppo-
sition. He highlights the role played in this opposition by weapons
manufacturers, who work through organizations such as the National
Shooting Sports Foundation, created "to foster in the American public
a better understanding and a more active appreciation of all shooting
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sports." This organization serves two purposes: it propagandizes in
favor of a broader market for small arms and against the concept that
guns are dangerous. And it lobbies against restrictive gun legislation.
Participating with the arms industry in the National Shooting Sports
Foundation, according to Mr. Bakal, are the Wildlife Management
Institute and the National Wildlife Federation. The latter, through
affiliated conservation organizations, has an estimated 2,000,000
members.
But what Mr. Bakal refers to as "the spearhead of the gun lobby" is
the National Rifle Association, which has 700,000 to 800,000 members,
and is constantly expanding. It maintains close relationships with the
Department of the Army and with various conservationist groups;
many members of Congress and state legislators belong to it; even an
organization such as the National Safety Council, which one would
expect to favor measures designed to reduce death and injury by gun-
fire, has interlocking membership with the NRA to an extent that its
small arms policies parallel, and seem to be set by, the NRA.
The NRA purports to favor measures which will promote safety
without impinging upon the right to bear arms, yet it has opposed
legislation which would merely require conformity to minimum safety
requirements. In one case the NRA did publicly support restrictive
Federal legislation, but even in that situation it lobbied against the
legislation, which died in committee.
The tradition of private possession of guns may be a part of our
history, but guns are as alien to the spirit of modem urban society as
they may have been natural to the society of the frontier. Urban life
is abrasive at best; the presence within it of private arsenals of lethal
weapons cannot help but exacerbate its basic tensions. Where a gun
may have been necessary for food and survival in yesterday's rural
America, it does not serve any useful purpose in today's urban America.
So long as hand guns are in relatively common currency in our
society, it will undoubtedly be necessary for us to continue to arm our
police. If, however, we were to eliminate the criminal's easy access to
guns, then we should certainly want to give careful consideration to
an unarmed police force. We have reached a stage of political maturity
in which we are extending, through a series of far-reaching judicial
decisions, the basic concepts of individual liberty set forth in the Bill
of Rights. We are attempting to make meaningful our traditional
clich6-that all men are innocent until proven guilty; we are attempt.
ing to insure that the interests of the defendant are competently pro-
tected at all stages of the criminal process, from arrest to appeal. At
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this level of maturity it is certainly incongruous to charge our law
enforcement officers with the power and even the duty to act as judge
and jury through the use of firearms. And yet, until guns are no longer
available to our criminals, the safety of society requires that our police
officers be armed and able, where necessary, to use their weapons.
In our increasingly urbanizing society gun control legislation must
come. There will always be a place for the gun in the woods of Maine,
the mountains of Montana and the swamps of Florida. On Park Avenue
and in Harlem and in the streets of Dallas, it is an impermissible
anomaly.
VINCENT BRODERICKf
The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence. By Max Gluckman.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. xix, 299.
$7.50.
Two generations ago writers on the nature of law in human affairs
could dismiss primitive societies as lawless, or, if the writer had some
firsthand knowledge of a primitive people, he was apt to give but a
few pages to law in his ethnographic report. He might sketch a few
highly generalized normative rules and represent them as the sub-
stantive law of a tribal population. But in the opening decades of this
century, R. F. Barton and Bronislaw Malinowski published full-scale
monographs on systems of tribal law which they had studied at first
hand and in some depth;' they opened the door to the realization that
tribal cultures may have well-developed legal systems. In a half century
of anthropological jurisprudence, a small but high-quality body of
scientific studies of legal systems has emerged. Professor Gluckman's
1968 Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence are the latest and, in many
ways, the most sophisticated.
Gluckman conducted his field research during two and a third years
of residence among the Barotse of Botswana. This Bantu tribal nation
consists of more than two dozen sometime independent tribes under
the centralized political and legal control of a dominant tribe, the Lozi.
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1941, Princeton University, LLDB. 1948, Harvard
University.
1. These were the now classic: BARToN, IFUGAO LAw (1919), and MAmow , Cra.Im
AND Cusrom iN SAVAGE SociErry (1926).
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The entire national population numbers about 300,000, a sizable
"primitive" state.
The Barotse, although "primitive" and non-literate, represent a rela-
tively high level of cultural development. Their mixed subsistence
economy is based on intensive gardening, supplemented by cattle and
goat herding, hunting, and fishing. Their political state is centrally
organized around a king and his fulsome royal bureaucracy. Justice
is administered through a series of elaborately staffed courts in which
princes, royal stewards, and local headmen constitute three benches
of well-versed justices.2
Gluckman's contribution is significant in its intensive reflection of
the character of modem anthropological jurisprudence. He does not
write about "Barotse Law"; there is no neat, pseudo-systematic code
of presumptive substantive legal norms. Rather, Gluckman approaches
the topic through procedure in his first book and through juridical
concepts here. In the first volume he observes how the dispute-settling
and law-enforcing agencies cope with their tasks and in the second
he identifies and analyzes Barotse basic postulates and their derivative
concepts of the nature of things, man, and society.
In The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence Professor Gluckman has given
us a formidable book that may, most unfortunately, discourage all but
the most dedicated of readers. Its difficulty lies in its diffuse organiza-
tion and in the complexity of its use of analogy in comparisons. The
author's learning in medieval English and European legal and social
history, in political and legal theory, and in comparative ethnography
is impressive. Gluckman wishes to illuminate the Barotse scene by
cross-lighting from comparable (not necessarily identical) events and
ideas in early English and medieval European law and constitutional
structure. Conversely, the Barotse materials are focused upon English
and European history to add new illumination to the growth of our
own legal institutions. The intent is legitimate and the result valid
(in my judgment), for in this way alone a science of law can develop.
Barotse ideas in their own terms would have meaning and significance
only to the Barotse themselves.
But I must confess to the feeling that in this book Gluckman's erudi-
tion sometimes becomes his master rather than his servant. His analogic
cadenzas can often numb the mind.
2. For information on the structure of the Barotse court system and its modes of
procedure, the reader should go to Gluckman's earlier volume, THE JUDICIAL PROcrSs
AMONG THE BAROTSE oF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955).
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To help other readers to overcome this effect, I suggest that they
not undertake to work straight through the book on first reading.
Rather, an initial concentration on the parts in which the essential
Barotse concepts are presented with little comparative adornment may
better prepare them for a secondary digestion of the whole. A useful
formula would be to read the first three chapters, "The Process of
Tribal Law," "The Barotse Constitution and Their Theory of Power,"
and "Status and Rights in Land" as far as page 94. Chapters four, five
and seven may be temporarily by-passed in favor of chapter six, "The
Importance of Obligation in Contract" and chapter eight, "Obligation
and Debt." This will convey the Barotse system of jurisprudence as a
more readily comprehensible unit.
The central theme of the Barotse system is that legal rights and
obligations arise from a person's statuses in relation to the king and
the royal subordinates (particularly the village headmen) and in rela-
tion to his own kinsmen, blood brothers, friends and co-villagers. "Free
contractual relations between persons not united by social position
were thus relatively few and unimportant in Barotse life." On the
contrary, "We find that every [legal] doctrine is influenced by the fact
that the society is dominantly organized around fixed, permanent, and
multiplex status relationships." 4 Barotse social organization and legal
constructs exemplify Sir Henry Maine's status-dominated socio-legal
type. Gluckman demonstrates in rich detail what Sir Henry, a century
ago, could limn only in gross outline.
Because all Barotse statuses build to a pyramidal point in the office
of the king, the kinship becomes Gluckman's point of departure for
his entire study. Any legal order seeks the transpersonalization of power
and the allocation of authority to compel behavior in keeping with
legal norms. Gluckman's account of the Barotse's structural solutions
is a salute to human ingenuity.
Land, in this primitive horticultural economy, is the nexus from
which all property flows. The king is the immediate "owner" of all
unused land and of specific king's gardens; he is the ultimate "owner"
of all Barotse land. He symbolizes the public entity of the Barotse
people as a society. From his title as "owmer" flow a number of royal
rights and prerogatives. But--"The king not only has rights in the
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Barotse scheme of things is the postulate that every Barotse male has
a right to a minimal plot of land for his own use. And-"Once the
King has given land to a subject the latter has in it rights which are
protected against all comers." 6 Between the king and ordinary lands-
man is an elaborate hierarchy of officials, each with a special status
relation to the land, the king, and the people. Gluckman meticulously
spells out "the hierarchy of estates" that make up the substantive land
law; and he shows how these are expressed in legal process and thought.
Land is not sold, rented, or pledged. "People acquire rights in land
in virtue of their status, as citizens, as villagers, as kinsfolk."1 The idea
of a status claim of all citizens upon the national estate through the
universal guarantee of a minimum annual income is to us a revolution-
ary new thought. To the Barotse, who certainly are not communists,
it is old hat.
The central theme that runs through all extensions and elaborations
of the Barotse law of property is that, "-property law defines not so
much the rights of persons over things as the obligations owed between
persons in respect of things." Although Anglo-American law largely
ignored this point in doctrine before Hohfeld, the Barotse, as Gluck-
man demonstrates, built upon it both in concept and practice. The
exemplification of the principle in the closing chapters on obligation
in contract and debt is beautiful in its clarity and morality. We are
shown why and how a transfer of property is essential to create a new
legal obligation, for property symbolizes the nexus of a new status
relationship. Because the conceptual emphasis is rooted in the personal
relationship rather than the thing, the courts, the law, and the Barotse
at large expect a man to look to his obligations rather than to his rights.
Such is the state of mind of legal man in the under-developed,




t Professor of Anthropology, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1928, University of Wis-
consin; M.A. 1930, New York University; Ph.D. 1934, Columbia University.
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The Pretrial Conference and Effective Justice. By Maurice
Rosenberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
Pp. 249. $6.50.
The pretrial conference has been part of the American system of
procedure for barely twenty-five years. During that time, some modest
claims have been made for it: that it makes the trial a bit less of a
game and more of a search for truth; that it reduces surprise and
trickery; and that it acts as a salutory "poor man's discovery." Today,
with the law explosion pressing hard upon our courts, more dramatic
claims are being heard: that pretrial may be the solution to the log-jam
in the courts. A new study by Maurice Rosenberg supports the modest
claims and discourages the bold.
The basic empirical data underlying Rosenberg's conclusions comes
from a New Jersey study conducted with the aid of the state supreme
court. During a test period, the usual compulsory pretrial conference
in personal injury suits was made optional in alternate cases. Three
categories of cases thus emerged: those in which a pretrial conference
was compulsory; those in which a pretrial conference was optional and
was refused; and those in which a pretrial conference was optional and
was held. The New Jersey experiment provided the first empirical
test in which the presence or absence of a pretrial conference was the
only major variable.
Certain claims made in favor of the pretrial conference were sup-
ported by the study: pretried cases were generally better prepared; the
theory of the case and the issues involved emerged more clearly; the
evidence was better presented; and both judges and attorneys involved
agreed that the pretrial conference tended to eliminate surprise at
trial and led to substantially fairer trials. These results were mitigated
where counsel themselves appeared not to take the conference seriously,
coming to it ill-prepared or sending junior members of the firm who
then took no further part in the proceedings.
The bolder claims sometimes heard in favor of the pretrial conference
were simply not supported by the data: the pretrial conference did not
lead to fewer cases reaching trial; it did not reduce the length of time
required for the trial itself; and it eliminated neither appeals nor
reversals on appeal. Nor did the study support the contention that
pretrial conference increases the frequency or the amount of plaintiffs'
awards.
Furthermore, the New Jersey experiment seems to have left un-
resolved a basic point at issue concerning the role of the judge at the
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conference and the goals of the conference itself. It is not at all clear
whether the pretrial judge should play an active role, vigorously using
the conference to promote a pretrial settlement, or whether he should
play a passive role, allowing the parties to use the conference for their
own ends. During the New Jersey test period, only two per cent of
the cases in which pretrial conferences were held actually settled at
the conference itself. And the holding of a pretrial conference did not
reduce the number of cases (approximately 23 % in all three groups)
requiring trial. Nor did it reduce the length of time needed for
settlement.
It would seem from this that the pretrial conference is not a success-
ful device for inducing settlements, whatever other advantages it may
possess. However, the fact that pretrial conferences did not lead to more
settlements may itself be a function of the view that judges took toward
the goals of the conference. If judges do not actively try to achieve
settlement through the pretrial conference, it is unlikely that settle-
ment will result.
On the other hand, for judges to wield their power at the pretrial
conference in an attempt to induce settlement would also raise serious
problems: for example, whether a forced settlement is necessarily a
just one; and what limits ought to be set on a judge's coercive powers,
given our adversary system.
In addition to its presentation of the objective data from the New
Jersey experiment, the Rosenberg volume also gives us a valuable sub-
jective collection of the attitudes, opinions and impressions of the New
Jersey judges themselves. The judges clearly reflect the divergent views
on the goals of the pretrial conference and the judge's function at it.
Some regard settlement merely as a welcome by-product of a successful
conference; others regard it as a goal in itself, though many seem to
feel that the pretrial conference might serve most successfully to open
the way for a subsequent settlement conference, after the issues and
the evidence available have been initially explored.
Regardless of their views concerning the goals of the pretrial con-
ference, most judges concurred in pinpointing certain shortcomings.
Basically, they objected, pretrial conferences tended to be rather sloppy
affairs. The practice of scheduling three conferences in an hour meant
that issues could not be fully explored, and all too often lawyers at the
conferences were simply ill-prepared. Although most judges agreed that
citations for contempt would be too strong a sanction to use against
poorly prepared counsel, they disagreed as to just what sanctions would
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be fair and effective. They also disagreed as to the proper atmosphere
and degree of formality for the pretrial conference.
Despite this measure of disagreement, certain positive suggestions
were made. It was concluded that the pretrial conference should be
oriented toward a trial rather than toward settlement, though settle-
ments would be welcomed, and the possibility of a special settlement
conference, under special circumstances, would not be ruled out. Since
the conference would be oriented toward trial, and since "big cases"
proceeded to trial relatively more often than cases involving smaller
amounts of damages, it was suggested that the pretrial conference might
be made compulsory only in cases potentially involving several thousand
dollars. In such cases, the lawyers tend to be better prepared and con-
ferences therefore stand a greater chance of success. Another potential
screen for cases proceeding to trial might be length of time spent in
discovery; cases involving more than two days of discovery are likely
to require a trial. Finally, it is suggested that any pretrial conference
plan contain a mechanism for testing its results.
As a relatively new innovation in our legal system, the pretrial con-
ference is still evolving. That it has advantages for the trial process is
apparent, though their dimensions are less so. Professor Rosenberg's
book gives us our first real basis for judging the worth of the pretrial
conference and for evaluating the changes that have been recommended
in its format.
MLVIN BL TL
The Power Broker. By Joseph Lieberman. Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Co. Pp. 365, 1966. $7.50.
Politicians are not in business to make peppery remarks about
American culture or tell professors how they win elections and influ-
ence people. This makes life very difficult for their biographers. There
is always that terrible moment when a politician who has always been
amusing and wise in backroom conversation begins to talk for the
record. Any tourist who has ever asked a Maine farmer where the blue-
berries are will know what I mean. A politician is never out of politics
until he has been sent to the undertaker: until then he considers any-
t- Member of the California Bar. BA. 1929, University of California; LL.B. 1933,
Boalt Hall School of Law.
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thing he knows as an industrial secret for his personal use only. Doing
a politician's biography, difficult under the best conditions, is even
more complicated when the politician in question has been running
party affairs so long that he has become the chief oral historian of the
affairs of which he is also the perennial protagonist, and therefore in
an excellent position to give history a tweak now and then in the
interests of his own reputation.
Such a politican is John Moran Bailey, the subject of an engrossing
book entitled The Power Broker by Joseph I. Lieberman. Bailey is
chairman of the Democratic National Committee and head of Con-
necticut's Democratic Party. In addition to being a party leader with
nine lives, he has at various times performed, unofficially, many of the
chores and made many of the decisions of governors, senators, com-
missioners, delegates and assemblymen when they were too weak or
overwhelmed to handle matters themselves. To write intelligently about
Bailey one must also describe a whole series of institutions and prac-
tices. This is just what Lieberman has done, presenting a comprehen-
sive picture of Bailey as an individual and the state's Democratic Party
as an organization.
Like most other party organization men Bailey is an engineer with
an aversion to ideas, especially if they are new or controversial. But
unlike most of his fellow practitioners he is neither pompous nor a
bore. In fact, he is far more entertaining than most of the people he
has helped make famous. His huge supply of anecdotes, each of which
may constitute an essay on the nature of Connecticut politics, makes
good reading. However, Bailey's ability as a raconteur can raise a special
problem for writers trying to maintain their objectivity. He has been
known to reduce reporters to such a state of amused helplessness that
they have been detoured rather easily around the less appetizing aspects
of party politics as it is customarily practiced under the Chairman's
benevolent supervision.
Lieberman's own (and admitted) affectionate fascination with Bailey
may have dented his objectivity at times, but the damage is minor.
The author's enforced tendency to look at the world through Bailey's
spectacles much of the time may even be a strength of the book, in
view of the fact that so much of the current literature still peers at the
modern political boss as if he were the ghost of William Croker. The
book has very little specific, attributable comment on Bailey by his
most articulate critics; however, the absence of such comment is prob-
ably not Lieberman's fault, since most of these critics have little desire
to be quoted. Like Bailey, they also consider themselves still in or on
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the edges of the political business and they know that it is unsound
practice to be jabbing at another politician whose goodwill they may
have to cultivate later.
Lieberman has put these very appropriate words of Governor Willie
Stark (in All the King's Men) on the flyleaf of his book: "One thing I
understand and you don't, is what makes the mare go. I can make the
mare go." Lieberman then proceeds to tell us about the temperament
and anatomy of the mare and how Chairman Bailey makes the mare
go. He tracks the two of them through corridors, caucuses, conventions,
campaigns and all the rooms, small and large, in which minds, reputa-
tions and decisions are made and unmade.
This reviewer's impressions of Connecticut politics are based on con-
siderable reading between the lines and very free translations of what
Lieberman himself may have in mind.
As Lieberman notes, Bailey often draws analogies between Connecti-
cut politics and big league baseball. They are both highly competitive
professional sports, and the main purpose in both instances is to "win
big." The Democratic Party organization under Bailey's leadership has
had about the same interest in a political philosophy as the pitching
staff of the Cleveland Indians. The purpose of winning an election is
to get ready to win the next one. In between victories the party adopts
the philosophy of its governors and senators of the moment if these
gentlemen have a particular philosophy; in times of eclipse when Bailey
is the party's de facto leader, the organization concentrates entirely on
muscle building and gossip. As a consequence, the organization has a
short attention span and a history of yielding to ramshackle influences
quite unrelated to major public discontents. In power it readily adapts
itself to violent swings between governmental passivity and liberal inter-
ventionism. In recent years the organization has even demonstrated an
ability to swing both ways at once, an example being its current en-
thusiasm over both Thomas Dodd and Abraham Ribicoff.
Chairman Bailey's indifference to ideas per se makes him an ideal
leader for his party organization-and here let a sharp distinction be
made between the "organization," which is the party machinery, and
the "party," which I take to be a confused heterogeneous gathering
including elected officials and all registered rank and file party mem-
bers, active or not. It seems clear from Lieberman's book that the
organization cannot be accused of excessive haste in receiving new
ideas, or any ideas at all for that matter. The organization has a purely
tactical function. All that is required is success.
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As an engineer interested in smooth performance, the chairman has
a deep distrust of the broad-based free-wheeling politicking charac-
teristic of California's Democratic Party, with its policy advisory com-
mittee, its leftish liberal California Democratic Council, and its open
primaries. Control of his Hartford County organization, plus the mas-
sive refusal of the state's voters to register with either party, has enabled
the chairman to avoid the sort of chaos that perpetually afflicts West
Coast politics. Even in the tidiest of arrangements there is, of course,
some discomfort, and Bailey is extremely ill at ease with any Democrat
who lives outside Hartford County, especially if the Democrat is a
suburbanite, a member of a minority group, a union dues-payer,
a New York City commuter, an opinionated housewife, a professor or a
civil rights demonstrator. Efforts of such people to gain a foothold in
the organization are stubbornly resisted by professionals who hold that
a union man's place is in the factory and a woman's place is in the
home.1 While the miniscule Negro representation at state party con-
ventions has been growing, the state's Negro population is of little
political consequence. The Democratic organization is impressed by
the quantity of a minority group, not the quality of its problems; and
for this reason the Negro is ignored politically and kicked around
socially and economically. For details one might look into how he fares
in most of the cities' urban renewal slum clearance and anti-poverty
programs (New Haven excepted).
Bailey's control has been built on narrowing the organizational base
of the party to the people he knows and the people who respond to
patronage; thus, he concentrates on a few large cities and encourages
the hinterlands to stay quiet until after convention time. The chair-
man's Hartford-is-the-world strategy works in Connecticut, but his pro-
vincialism has been a tremendous handicap to him in Washington,
where as head of the Democratic National Committee he must deal
with a great diversity of power groups that include an impressive liberal
coalition whose sympathizers have been pretty well run out of
Connecticut.
Nor has Bailey's customary disapproval of dissent within the party
worked to his advantage in the nation's capital. His refusal to accept
an invitation in Washington to speak to the College Young Democrats,
1. With the exception of Katherine Quinn, who dispenses patronage under Bailey's
direction, and Ella Grasso, the Secretary of State, women play a decidedly subordinate
role in the organization. Female members of the Democratic State Central Committee
are expected to be seen and not heard, as are most of the ladies who serve as vice-
chairmen of the local organizations.
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who have criticized the administration's Vietnam policy, is typical of
the chairman's attitude that the non-conforming Democrat is no Demo-
crat at all. Not all of the causes of the decline of Bailey's influence in
Washington are known, but certainly one of them, an inattention to
ideas, was born of the low-level pragmatism that has served him so well
in his home state.
In Connecticut, Bailey's genius lies in his ability to mediate and
conciliate. Here he does not conform to the traditional stereotype of
the boss who makes a profession of pushing people around. On occa-
sions the chairman will "knock heads together" (a phrase heard at
party conventions), but he does so only after assembling an undeniable
majority for a prospective candidate or a piece of legislation. When
important blocs in the organization are drifting or undecided, Bailey
may poll their leaders with highly suggestive questions-another way
of saying he may put his hand on the scales if it seems possible to turn
matters in the direction of his own preferences. In 1954, for instance,
Bailey traveled about the state toting up the preferences of local leaders
for a gubernatorial candidate. He committed himself to nobody, but,
his assessment of the credits and debits of Bowles and Ribicoff had
only to be added up to arrive at the blinding revelation that Ribicoff
was the man for the nomination if the party wanted to win. In 1958,
in Bailey's "neutral" discussions with party leaders concerning the
Bowles-Benton-Dodd contest for the Senate nomination, every other
sentence was a reminder that Dodd was the only one of the three
who had threatened a primary if he lost the convention's designation.
To an organization that fears primaries like the plague, the message
was unmistakable.
The most important requirement of the convention is that the course
of events be determined before the delegates arrive. At one convention,
when the chairman was faced with an unexpected rebellion, he told the
presiding officer to recess the convention because "this thing is getting
out of control." Bailey, who rarely expresses himself so bluntly, was
simply giving unrehearsed testimony to the fact that the primary re-
quirement of such a gathering is that it be docile. The extent to which
his anxiety about disorder is shared by second echelon organization
leaders is illustrated by their preconvention behavior. If there is the
slightest uncertainty about the state leadership's choice of candidates
for various party nominations, local leaders will almost always refuse
to commit themselves. In fact they will do their best to discourage any
public discussion of convention business. The scattering of delegations
across the state that do come out for a candidate who is not already an
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incumbent are felt to have committed a hostile act against the party
leadership which will be counted against them later on. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that only the most foolhardy candidates try to build
up a following by preconvention campaigning for delegates. The wise
ones wait politely and hope for favorable consideration in Hartford.
The organization's policy of preconvention silence is sometimes en-
forced by threats of reprisal against delegations that propose to give a
preconvention hearing to candidates critical of the state leadership.
Last year, for example, when an "anti-war" candidate for the Fourth
District Congressional nomination was invited to speak, pressure was
applied to the delegation issuing the invitation, and the candidate was
promptly disinvited. Of course there are exceptions to the rule, notably
Senator Dodd, who shows no deference at all towards Chairman Bailey
and whose intransigence is his stock in trade. But Dodd is a very special
case, because he can count on his hostility to Democratic liberalism
striking a very responsive chord in the lower reaches of the organization.
If the chairman likes to iron out the convention with a minimum of
discussion, he has considerable justification for doing so as things stand
now. To try to reach considered judgments through full dress, public
discussion during a four or five day convention is to invite the sort of
pandemonium typical of the last day of the state legislature. Further-
more, the delegates themselves would be totally mystified at the out-
break of a dialogue on public issues. Issues are supposed to be taken
care of by platform committees while the delegates are out drinking.
The delegates of the large cities on whom Bailey builds his coalitions
do not see themselves as representatives of a constituency. They are
members of that minute sector of the population that has made politics
a full-time paying job, they do not stray off the reservation if they want
to return the next time, and they bitterly resent those who do not play
the game according to the old-fashioned rules.
Such delegates have little rapport with the type of small town delega-
tion, in which one used to find a Malcolm Cowley or an Odell
Shephard, that comes to Hartford with some idea of asserting itself
on matters of principle. The individualism of such small town delega-
tions is their downfall: they find it impossible to form combinations or
blocs which might offset the city coalitions. A political leader who could
unite the smaller towns could substantially alter the balance of power
at party conventions, or at least command Bailey's serious attention, but
such a giant-killer is not on the horizon.
"Some kind of widespread enthusiasm or excitement is needed..
2. E. HoFpmE, Tim TRUE BEuEVR 3 (1951).
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In many respects the argument over what a political organization
ought to be doing is like the controversy over what constitutes a good
newspaper. Should the paper be run as a sound, money-making enter-
prise, or is it supposed to inform the public and thereby serve the
general welfare and the local community? Apparently the two roles
are not mutually exclusive if one is to believe one's ears at the annual
meetings of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, at which
very rich publishers talk about the community responsibilities of their
newspapers and the people's right to know. But the press, like so many
state political parties, seems to have fallen under the sway of the ac-
countants in the back room-rather old-fashioned and unreliable
accountants, by the way-and it is natural that these two institutions
should so often be found feeding each others' weaknesses.
The fate of people like Robert Hutchins who insist on detailing the
shortcomings of the mass media is similar to that of those who want
to see changes in our politics: if the critics are lucky they can activate
a few ulcers, but for the most part they are dismissed as a bad lot who
know very little about the facts of life, the most important of which is
that the public gets cheap merchandise because that is what the public
wants.
Connecticut's Republican and Democratic organizations make little
pretense to operating as representative bodies or as vessels of public
enlightenment. They have no guilt feelings about it because they are
practical, and a public spirit is impractical in a body preoccupied with
private interests.
One consequence of this state of affairs is that it is almost impossible
to tell the lobbyists from the legislators in the biennial sessions of the
General Assembly, a situation also true in Sacramento, California,
where one harassed assemblyman has asked for a law requiring lobby-
ists to wear identification buttons so that he will know to whom he is
talking. Another consequence is that the party professionals can still
run the legislature as if it were a privately owned supermarket.
This is not to say that each party does not have an allegiance to some
official public philosophy. The assembly's Democrats have been rather
faithful about passing run-of-the-mill social legislation-providing it
doesn't cost very much-and the Republicans have never ceased to
remind the electorate that a strong nation depends on thrifty house-
keeping. But these are postures rather than philosophies, designed
chiefly to hang on to campaign contributors. Each party understands
the other's problem, so that when occasional confrontations do develop
in the legislature, the heat that one ordinarily expects over an ideologi-
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cal disagreement is missing. Legislators are often quite willing to dis-
regard theoretical party lines on a bill outlawing racial discrimination
in the National Guard, or one which would lift restrictions on clam
digging at Connecticut beaches. The real thunder and lightning occurs
when there is an argument over patronage. The assembly's voting
records show the highest degree of party cohesion on such matters.
There are other factors that make it highly unlikely that the state's
organizational politics and government will assume a more responsible
role. For one thing, there is little sign of real public pressure for change,
explainable at least in part by a gathering public impression that state
government and state politics are irrelevant and archaic and con-
sequently not worth bothering about. The public apathy is constantly
reinforced by repeated demonstrations that governors are impotent in
the face of political parties impervious to ideas and that the legislature
is chronically afflicted with what Frank Trippett calls "microphilia"-
an obsession with trivia.3 Moreover, the party organizations are still
unable to make even the minor decisions necessary to organize and
vote on a legislative program without Bailey around to give instruc-
tions. Lieberman gives a striking description of the panic that assailed
Connecticut's Democratic legislators in 1961 when Bailey, because of
his Washington commitments, was not to be found at his customary
pillar in the corridor of the State Capitol:
The absence of Bailey's old familiar voice around the Capitol
was beginning to have its effect. As one Democratic town chair-
man tells it: "My representatives really began to grumble. They
didn't know what was going on. They didn't know what caucuses
were going to be held or what the party positions were ......
As May began Democratic anxieties increased. Haggling con-
tinued over budget and tax programs, but nothing passed....
During the third week in May Bailey sent word that he would
return to Connecticut for the last eight days of the session ... he
did indeed arrive in Hartford and he set about solving legislative
difficulties in the best deus ex machina that any great drama could
offer. Out of confusion Bailey brought order. On a heretofore
barren record he placed significant accomplishments . . . the
Governor had a record.
The episode is symbolic of the way the organization functions even
in those rare instances when it has a purposeful governor-a Bowles or
a Ribicoff-to goad it. The episode also reveals some of Bailey's major
weaknesses as a leader. While he did bring order out of confusion, the
responsibility for the confusion lay in his excessive reliance on improvi-
S. F. TRirPETr, THE STATES: UNITED TnEY FE=T. 172-84 (1967).
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sation and in his failure to train leaders to take over some of his own
responsibilities. The chairman has always found it easy to extricate
himself from difficult situations, but almost impossible to anticipate
them. And he places his confidence in people on whose personal loyalty
he can count regardless of what he does. Such loyalists are not likely
to have the independence and energy necessary to lead wisely in his
absence. The chairman's apparent belief that to develop an able sub-
ordinate is to set the stage for one's own overthrow probably stems from
his experience in deposing his own political mentor, T.J. Spellacy.
All of the foregoing is by way of emphasizing my strong disagreement
with two of Lieberman's main conclusions about Connecticut's political
system. First, I don't agree that the "one area" in which the state has
lagged behind is in its failure to "adopt reforms in its political struc-
ture." Lieberman does not specify the reforms he has in mind except
to suggest the adoption of a truly direct primary (which would make
Chairman Bailey obsolete), and the giving of more home rule to local
governments. Lieberman's reforms are designed to make the party
organization more responsive to its general membership. I have already
indicated my agreement with these suggestions, but they do not strike
at the heart of the matter. Technical alterations will do little to change
the nature of Connecticut's political process. Its most serious weaknesses
have to do with values and goals, not with procedures. What is needed
is for the state's parties to learn how to think about major public prob-
lems before they become catastrophes.
A second Lieberman conclusion to which I take exception is his
statement that "the record shows that the modem political boss, John
Bailey, while pursuing little more than political advantage, has made
for more effective democracy in Connecticut. . . .He has built the
Democratic Party into a strong and united political body. That strength
and unity have allowed him to exercise authority. That authority has
been used in the state's competitive political system to make the party
significantly responsive to the popular will." But over the past thirty
years both parties have been quite unwilling to grapple with the state's
major problems. In the 30's and 40's, when the state's customary indus-
try and agriculture grew feeble and scores of communities were left in
anguish with the death of the textile mills, the rural wire and hat
factories, and much of its small-scale farming, the political response
was hardly "effective democracy."
Now the state is entering another cycle of change for which its politics
is equally unprepared. Connecticut communities of all descriptions are
being swollen by migrations of new workers, by escapees from the city,
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and by a small but rapidly growing number of people who cannot be
absorbed by the new job market. All of these people require space,
housing, schools, employment, health and welfare services and trans-
portation. Their presence is making old systems of taxation, zoning,
and education obsolete. What has been the political response? The
political system has not yet even fully identified the challenges.
I am also inclined against Lieberman's view (the prevailing one)
that Connecticut politics has been remarkably free of corruption. There
seems to be very little proof one way or the other. It is true that since
1938, when a whole crew of Waterbury Democratic leaders, including
the Lieutenant Governor, were convicted of fraud and conspiracy, few
politicians of either party have been sent to jail or accused of downright
malfeasance. But, the assumption that 1938 produced a revolution in
political morals is something else again.
Connecticut government and politics has been unusually immune to
sharp and impartial investigation, either by government or the press.
The state does not have an agency analogous to the New York State
Investigation Commission. Most important, the Connecticut public is
without information on the manner in which organized private inter-
ests have dominated the activities of its legislatures year in and year
out regardless of what party held the governor's chair. Connecticut does
not possess newspapers like the New York Times, which painstakingly
catalogs the questionable practices of politicians and public officials.
The Connecticut press, radio and television is not very good at the
sort of investigative reporting needed to uncover shady practices in
the Capitol.
The state's newspapers are badly undermanned in Hartford, as is
the press in most state capitals, with one or two staffers required to
cover everything from the fate of hundreds of bills to the doings of
commissioners and ward leaders. One extreme example of thin cover-
age was the now defunct "bureau" of a wire service, consisting of one
man who gathered his news by telephone and never left his cubby-hole
several blocks from the Capitol.
Another obstacle to better press coverage is the unseemly reliance
of some reporters on the state party chairman, to the point where Bailey
and his Republican opposite number in effect write much of the state's
political news.
One distinguished journalist who has observed the press and Con-
necticut politics has summed up his impression in these words: "You
know how politics is covered. Individuals who stand up against the
system are actually creamed by the press. The reporters dutifully wait
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outside for the leaders to write their stories, which in turn become
self-fulfilling prophecies."
When the public does get wind of irregularities or suspected mis-
behavior, the tipoff as often as not comes from the press outside the
state, or from non-press sources. The disclosures about Senator Dodd's
alleged misuse of funds raised at his testimonial dinners and of federal
travel funds came to light because ex-members of Dodd's staff went to
a national columnist with their charges. It is this observer's view that
they were wise in doing so. It is hard to believe that Dodd's activities
were not known to some Connecticut reporters, especially since after
the Drew Pearson disclosures the Democratic Town Chairman, Arthur
Barbieri of New Haven, declared that there had been no mystery about
Dodd's use of his dinner contributions and that he, Barbieri, saw
nothing wrong with what Dodd had done.
However, the Connecticut press is not by any means the real culprit.
Its inability to police the parties is paralleled by the more significant
refusal of the parties to police one another. The parties' tender regard
for each other's collective reputation is based on self-interest, not altru-
ism. For a long time both parties have by mutual, tacit consent engaged
in practices which although technically legal, would certainly test the
sensibilities of a good many, if not all, Connecticut voters if they were
known. Particularly where patronage is involved, there is an unwritten
inter-party agreement to overlook each other's didoes. Questionable
practices which do come to light almost always have a strong bi-partisan
odor. An example, described in detail by Lieberman, was the disclosure
that state insurance contracts were being awarded on a patronage basis
to political leaders in both parties. When a maverick Republican legis-
lator named Nicholn Eddy attempted to expose this ancient system of
subsidizing party leaders at public expense, leaders of both party
organizations did everything they could to obstruct the investigation,
even to the point of withholding records to which the public had every
right of access. In the end, after the facts did come out, these same
leaders protested that no laws had been broken.
A common rejoinder to the charge that the Democratic organization
is sterile of ideas and repressive of intellectual dissent is to point to the
distinguished leaders the party has given the state. The rejoinder mis-
represents the relationship of these distinguished leaders with the or-
ganization. The philosophies and personalities of Democratic governors
and senators often seem curiously detached from the rest of the party
anatomy. Such outstanding Connecticut public servants as McMahon,
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Bowles, Ribicoff, Benton and Mayor Richard Lee of New Haven might
even be called party accidents. Certainly they have not inspired over-
whelming affection in the lower levels of the party hierarchy. McMahon
obtained the Senate nomination through the influence of his mentor,
Attorney General Homer Cummings of Stamford, and once elected he
played a lone hand. His ill-concealed distaste for the organization small
fry, coupled with a tendency to be pompous, made him so unpopular
with some leaders in his own county that on occasions he had to appeal
to Bailey to get them in line with his own wishes. William Benton was
even more of a party accident, not only because he first reached the
Senate by appointment but also because his style and his views were
very much at odds with the party traditionalists. Benton's fight against
McCarthy made him so unpopular to many of Connecticut's regulars
that there was even an effort to discourage him from campaigning for
the ticket in 1954.
Chester Bowles was unpopular with much of the organization rank
and file even before he became Governor, and defections within the
organization contributed to his narrow defeat in 1950. Bowles' nomina-
tion in 1948 was considered almost valueless because it was generally
assumed that Dewey would annihilate Truman, and some party leaders
saw Bowles' run that year as an excellent way to get rid of him. An
indication of how distasteful Bowles' aggressive liberalism was to a good
part of the organization was Dodd's radio speech at the height of the
campaign bitterly attacking the public housing program which was the
key plank in Bowles' platform.
Senator Ribicoff has also been eccentric to the party pattern, and his
rise in the Hartford organization as a judge and a Congressman is not
likely to be duplicated. In the early phase of his career he supported the
Citizens' Charter movement, a cause anathema to Bailey, and as he
grew in prominence it seems to some organization leaders that he went
out of his way to rebuke the party in public. His strategy developed
strong support among Republican and independent voters and his
successes at the polls gave him considerable independence of the orga-
nization. While the ward leaders grumbled more and more about
Ribicoff's tendency to go it alone, they were tied to him because he
was a winner, and because he allowed Bailey to handle patronage
matters. As a Cabinet member and Senator, Ribicoff continued to
develop his own style, and he has become absorbed in national rather
than sectional issues. It is significant that his contributions, like
McMahon's, have grown in direct proportion to the distance he has
been able to put between himself and the organizational politics of
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his home state. Washington, despite its own brand of insularity and
oppressive bureaucracies, not only stimulates but demands intellectual
activity and innovation.
Another party "accident" who has had less luck than Ribicoff in
making his way to the top, is Richard Lee, whose rise in New Haven
was very much a personal accomplishment. Formerly a public relations
officer at Yale University, with strong ties to the liberal wing of the
party, Lee's victory as Mayor came after several tries in which he re-
ceived lukewarm support from the New Haven organization.
The presence, then of a few bright lights does not change the fact
that the Democratic organization is unresponsive to the basic problems
facing Connecticut. Lieberman seems to feel that the cure lies in tech-
nical adjustments such as the adoption of a direct primary. But a real
cure can only come when the organization opens itself up to ideas and
people who deal in ideas. Unfortunately, the liberals in the Democratic
Party have lacked the persistence needed to remold the organization.
Like their leader, Chester Bowles, they have intervened in Connecticut
politics fitfully. As Lieberman notes at the conclusion of his book:
If major Democratic officeholders in Connecticut are not as
liberal as they might be, it is either because the voters of the state
did not want liberal leadership or because the liberal leaders did
not go out and convince the voters that they should want them.
Liberals yelled in 1958 when Tom Dodd, with Bailey's subtle
backing, defeated Chester Bowles and William Benton for the
nomination. But where were they over the years between elections
when Dodd was out on the hustings assiduously building popular
support?
Without active liberal participation the Democratic organization
cannot be changed from an old grey mare to a sleek racehorse. And as
long as the organization is a mare, it will need a man like John Bailey
to make it go.
In contrast to McMahon, Bowles, Ribicoff and Lee, the elected official
in the party who represents the emotional cast of the organization's
second echelon leadership is Senator Dodd. His attunement to the
basic conservatism of the big city organizations and his appeals to the
regulars' submerged antipathy to the "Bowles and Benton" liberals has
been a great political asset. His criticisms of Adlai Stevenson's and
President Kennedy's foreign policy and his investigations in Senate
committee hearings of Linus Pauling's patriotism may have embarrassed
the party nationally, but they have had considerable appeal in Con-
necticut. This appeal enabled Dodd to predict truculently and confi-
dently that he would defeat Bowles in a Democratic primary for the
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1958 Senate nomination-and Bailey's recognition of this fact played
a great part in convincing him that he and Governor Ribicoff should
stand aside at the convention that year.
However, the character of the organization cannot be blamed entirely
on those glandular conservatives in the party who seem to get their
inspiration from the politics of Arizona. The liberal wing of the party
has offered very little in the way of constructive criticism or effective
opposition to the status quo. Since Bowles' defeat for the Senate nomi-
nation at the 1958 convention the liberal wing has waned into insig.
nificance as an intellectual or political force, and the manner in which
some of its leaders buckled under Bailey's pressure at that convention
considerably diminished the liberals' reputation for courage in battle.
But even in their heyday during Bowles' governorship, the liberals
missed many opportunities to build a power base that might have
enabled them to remain in contention when Bowles left the picture.
The inability of its top leaders to stay put in Connecticut was a
serious drawback to the liberal cause. Bowles' governorship and Steven-
son's two Presidential campaigns brought out many thousands of new
reform-minded Democrats who might have had the capacity to change
the temper of the party. But the liberals needed day-in-day-out leader-
ship, and neither Bowles nor Benton were prepared to commit them-
selves to this role. Once they had been defeated for office, they left the
state mentally and physically to take over other public responsibilities.
Their departure could have been expected, because as creative men
they could not stand disuse, but their departure doomed any chance of
an effective liberal coalition in the party.
If major Democratic officeholders in Connecticut are not as lib-
eral as they might be, it is either because the voters of the state did
not want liberal leadership or because the liberal leaders did not
go out and convince the voters that they should want them. Lib-
erals yelled in 1958 when Tom Dodd, with Bailey's subtle backing,
defeated Chester Bowles and William Benton for the nomination.
But where were they over the years between elections when Dodd
was out on the hustings assiduously building popular support?
Bereft of leadership, much of the old Stevenson-Bowles contingent
decided the best course would be to make their peace with the old pros,
and play by their rules in the hope that party regularity would entitle
them to consideration in party matters. In some towns in which the
Volunteers for Stevenson had taken over the local Democratic orga-
nizations and revitalized them the newcomers' behavior soon became
indistinguishable from the old-liners they had replaced. They competed
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for appointments, stilled their criticism of Bailey, enthusiastically sup-
ported Senator Dodd's renomination in 1964 and lapsed into docility
at state conventions. The more stubborn of the liberal reformers who
did not go along with the "new realism" either dropped out of party
activities or were voted out. The history of Connecticut's liberal Demo-
crats is somewhat like that of New York City's insurgent reform
Democrats who entered politics during the Stevenson era, convinced
that the party should interest itself in community service, divorce the
reform dubs from patronage, demand a higher code of ethics from
public officials, provide a forum for discussion of public issues, and
bring more low-income and minority group people into the Democratic
organization. After the reform clubs had won their victories and re-
placed Tammany as the "official" organization in their election districts,
they discarded their old resolves. Their community service committees
withered and died. The dubs gave up active efforts to recruit low-
income Negroes and Puerto Ricans and thereby remained parochial,
middle class and white. Reform leaders and sub-leaders soon began a
scramble for judgeships and city jobs that is still increasing in intensity.
The rational discussion of public issues has been made difficult by the
emergence of a hard liberal orthodoxy quite as intolerant of devia-
tionists as the conservative orthodoxy of their Tammany predecessors.
And the reformers' code of ethics for public officials has shown itself
to be less than rigid: while the reform clubs are in total sympathy with
congressional efforts to punish Senator Dodd, whom they despise, for
alleged misuse of public funds, they have strongly condemned congres-
sional moves to discipline Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, whom they ad-
mire, for similar alleged offenses of a graver nature.
Any evaluation of Connecticut's Democratic Party organization and
Bailey's leadership must take into account what has happened to the
state and local governments to which the political system must adapt
itself. It bears repeating that, by and large, these governments are failing
institutions, and we have the testimony of assorted mayors and gov-
ernors before the Muskie Senate subcommittee to add to the record.
A long history of the states' refusal to reorganize their administrative
agencies, combined wsith a tradition that state governments should be
unobtrusive and their legislatures a part-time institution, has con-
tributed to the disintegration of state power. Reapportionment of the
Connecticut legislature at this late date will not restore representative
government overnight to a state that has accustomed itself to double
machine politics growing out of a system which guaranteed the Repub-
lican Party control of the lower House regardless of the popular -ill.
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Nor will the minor constitutional changes recently enacted by a polit-
ically controlled Constitutional Convention do much to shake the
prevalent idea in both party organizations that long-range planning
for social ends is a Marxist plot to destroy individual initiative and
raise the tax rate.
As state problems have grown, the areas of state government activity
have actually decreased. The result of this atrophy is that the state, like
others, is relying more and more on federal thinking, federal planning,
and massive federal aid to deal with such matters as crime prevention,
housing, welfare, education, the war on poverty, health and the control
of air and water pollution. A common symptom of the abdication of
responsibility by state and local governments is the hand-wringing of
Connecticut officials who will talk about the need for urban renewal
and better schools, but who offer study committees instead of workable
programs, and who will not face up to the necessity for new revenues
and new systems of taxation. In such a situation it is not remarkable
that the most useful skill a state or municipal executive can have today
is a genius for obtaining the biggest possible chunks of federal money,
regardless of whether or not he knows how to use it.
The stress of new challenges has simply revealed the extent to which
the life has been draining out of the local politics and institutions that
were intended to be our best means of responding sensibly to the
opportunities that come with age and growth. Almost all of the struc-
tures of government and party which Connecticut developed early in
the last century have been beautifully preserved, and the moral talk
that accompanies the transactions of the state and its political parties
on special occasions is still filled with reverence for man's dignity and
conscience. But the compassion, the excitement and enthusiasm, and
the faith in the goodness of human nature on which Eric Hoffer's
"sober desire for progress" depends have departed. In the process of
accommodating themselves to the way things seem to be, many state
political parties, like Connecticut's, have given up an intellectual and
creative life of their own, related to public wants and opinions, but also
quite distinct from them. It does not seem likely that without such an
interior intellectual life our politics can regain its relevance to the
human condition and become that "centre of new and original repre-
sentations" which Emile Durkheim believed to be the role of the
ideal state.
JosEPH P. LYFORDj
t Professor of Journalism, University of California.
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The editors share with the friends, colleagues and former students of
Professor Arthur L. Corbin a deep sorrow at his death. W\e were not
privileged to know him personally; but we have, as have many before us,
been shaped by his work. His presence at the Jaw School and in the law
continues unmdimtinished.
The brief remembrances contained in this issue wil be lollowed next
winter by articles contributed in memory of Professor Corbin.
